A 2022 sworn affidavit used by federal prosecutors in Bradley Lane Croft’s San Antonio federal case stated that defense counsel Thomas McHugh had “no knowledge” of a conflict involving former FBI agent Fred Olivares, who was embedded within Croft’s defense team. However, a 2018 Department of Justice letter—authored by federal prosecutor AUSA Gregory Surovics—directly contradicts that claim by confirming that McHugh was formally notified of the Olivares conflict years earlier. This means the 2022 affidavit was not just inaccurate—it was provably false, and the Government knew it.
The DOJ letter (2018) warned McHugh of the Olivares conflict. McHugh’s affidavit (2022) claimed he had no knowledge of the conflict. Both statements cannot be true. This contradiction forms the core of a growing concern: false evidence was knowingly used by federal prosecutors in Croft’s criminal case and in later post-conviction proceedings.
Olivares was not merely a consultant—he was a former FBI agent, previously involved in Croft’s investigation as an FBI agent, and embedded inside Croft’s defense team. This placed him in a position where he could access defense strategy, communications, and privileged information. When the DOJ itself warned about this issue in 2018, it triggered a constitutional obligation for defense counsel to disclose it, address it, and secure a conflict waiver. That never happened. Instead, McHugh denied the conflict existed at all—under oath—in 2022.
Despite having the 2018 DOJ letter in Government files, federal prosecutors relied on McHugh’s false affidavit to defend the integrity of the trial, dismiss claims of ineffective assistance, reject allegations of prosecution-related misconduct, and argue that no constitutional violations occurred. Both AUSA Gregory Surovics (who authored the 2018 letter) and later AUSA Fidel Esparza used and adopted the false affidavit in federal filings. This means two federal prosecutors advanced a position contradicted by their own agency’s documentation.
The contradiction sat quietly in the record until recent filings exposed it. The timeline is now unmistakable:
2018 — DOJ letter warns McHugh of Olivares conflict.
2022 — McHugh signs affidavit denying any knowledge.
2025 — Federal prosecutors rely on the false affidavit to defend the conviction.
2025 — The court adopts the false affidavit and denies relief based on it.
This is not a technicality or a harmless error. If the Government knew the affidavit was false—and used it anyway—this constitutes fraud on the court.
The exposure of this conflict is reshaping how the courts and the public view the case. It raises serious questions: How did a false affidavit become the backbone of the Government’s narrative? Why did two AUSAs advance a statement their own office had disproven years earlier? How many judicial rulings were influenced by the false affidavit? What accountability mechanisms exist when federal actors use false evidence?
This issue is no longer confined to one case—it is now a matter of public integrity and systemic accountability. More updates will follow as the legal fallout continues to unfold.